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TYPE 1 AND TYPE 2
PROCESSING—THE DICHOTOMY, THE
CONTINUUM, AND A TENTATIVE
THIRD WAY
Dual-process theories have dominated
social and cognitive psychology since
the 1970’s (Wason and Evans, 1975).
The tenets have gone through many
changes over time. This in mind, the
theoretical core amounts to a dichoto-
mous view of two types of processes
(Figure 1A): type 1—intuitive, fast,
automatic, nonconscious, effortless,
contextualized, error-prone, and type
2—reflective, slow, deliberate, cogitative,
effortful, decontextualized, normatively
correct 1. The received view (Evans, 2012)
of dual-process theories is evaluative 2;
Type 2 is better: it focuses on generalizable
logical form, it is more productive, and
closer to normative standards. However,
Evans (2012) acknowledges that unam-
biguous categorization into either type is
contentious. In the face of empirical and
conceptual arguments that the empha-
sized distinctions are rather quantitative
than qualitative (Osman, 2013), or that
both modes of thought are underpinned
by common mechanisms (Colder, 2011),
the dichotomy has given way to a con-
tinuous view (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer,
2011; Kruglanski, 2013)—Figure 1B. One
desirable effect of the continuum is an
integrated view of cognition, which affords
unified modeling of complex phenomena
1The relation between perceptual and affective, on the
one hand, and cognitive processes, on the other hand,
is, mutatis mutandis, analogous with that between
type 1 and type 2 reasoning.
2Sloman (1996) is a notable exception.
(argument from parsimony). Nonetheless,
it too is problematic. First, it calls upon
the need to fixate a turning point along the
continuum. Second, manifold phenomena
may be difficult to classify despite the lin-
ear relaxation of the dichotomy.
We tentatively propose a third way,
whereby processing features are rep-
resented in a tri-dimensional space
(Figure 1C). It uses three directly oper-
ationalizable, continuous dimensions
from the received view of dual-processes
theories: cognitive speed, effort, and con-
trol. “Cognitive effort” is the degree of
utilization of mental resources, namely
working memory, and computational
capacity. “Control” is a dimension rang-
ing from automatic to deliberate processes
(Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). We conjec-
ture that the hierarchy of processing goals
situates cognitive phenomena in the tri-
dimensional model; processing features
are goal-relative.
Because it represents processes as
combinations of features, our proposal
accommodates a broader range of phe-
nomena without the Procustian pitfall of
fitting them in a dichotomous pattern.
Acknowledging the possibility of complex,
effortful though automatic processes, for
instance, the proposal is more attuned to
recent findings that high-level cognition
is not necessarily deliberate (e.g., Day and
Gentner, 2007). Upon formal implemen-
tation, it affords integrated modeling of
complex phenomena, thus safeguarding
the argument from parsimony. Moreover,
it downplays the tendency for fallacious
(Evans, 2012) evaluative categorization of
types of information processing.
ILLUSTRATING TRI-DIMENSIONAL
PROCESSING
Twomain factors modulate processing fea-
tures: practice, and goals.
Computer scientist Raymond Kurzweil
states that “Predicting the future is actually
the primary reason that we have a brain.”
(Kurzweil, 2013; p. 31). We would add the
reason to change the future according to
our desires. The crucial reason for infor-
mation processing is the ability to interact
with the surrounding and to change it
according to our purposes. We have the
poly-faceted brains that we do for contex-
tually optimal pursuit of the goals that call
for our actions.
It is widely accepted that practice leads
to better results, faster, with less effort
(Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). Practice is
just the tip of the iceberg, since “a person’s
repertoire of strategies may depend upon
many factors, such as cognitive develop-
ment, experience, or formal education”
(Payne et al., 1993; p. 33). Nonetheless,
people typically engage in automatic,
effortless, fast processing on familiar tasks,
while relying on effortful and slow deliber-
ation for novel ones (Monsell, 2003). The
axes in Figure 1C are traversed through
practice left-to-right and bottom-up.
Because practice strengthens goals—sub-
goals (means) associations (Rosenbloom
and Newell, 1986; Duncan, 1990), we pro-
pose to capture its effects on processing
in terms of goals. Well-practiced actions
become defaults for achieving their goals.
Novelty is thus a contextual characteristic
that activates different goals or means.
Consider the cognitive processes that
underpin driving, a complex behavior
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Type 1 and type 2 processes - the dichotomy; (B) Type 1 and 2 processes - the continuum; (C) Tri-dimensional processing.
pursuing several sub-goals toward the
overarching goal of reaching the destina-
tion. Let us examine how goals modulate
processing features. Novices must control
every step, e.g., attend to the gear lever
while switching gears instead of watch-
ing the street. Each sub-goal is a task on
its own. Overall, information processing is
slow, effortful, and deliberate. With prac-
tice the sub-goals are integrated automat-
ically and with less effort. Expert drivers
normally process and perform faster the
required actions.
Consider the case of a Frenchman driv-
ing in London with the overarching goal to
reach TATEModern. Although integration
of the usual sub-goals, e.g., switch gears
without attending the lever, is fast, the
novel sub-goals, e.g., look right first, call
for effortful deliberate processing. Now
consider a driving instructor, i.e., a driver
pursuing the additional main goal to teach.
She must verbalize her steps such that her
pupil understands and executes correctly.
The pedagogical goal requires controlled
deliberation. Nonetheless procedural prior
knowledge of driving allows fast, effort-
less processing. Such examples are diffi-
cult to categorize as either type 1 or type
2 processing, while their tri-dimensional
position is rather straightforward.
Generally speaking, when action con-
sistency must be preserved across a differ-
ent range of goals compared with default
contexts, information processing is more
effortful, slow and deliberate—the price
of flexible thought. However, the underly-
ing well-practiced processes remain auto-
matic. We propose that deliberate control
of automatized behaviors in novel situa-
tions is top-down, from goal setting to
motor commands. The goal-centered anal-
ysis affords fine-grained categorization of
complex processes, and thereby overcomes
the “turning point” issue of continuous
dimensions.
TOWARD A COGNITIVE MODEL
The tri-dimensional view is amenable
to a realistic process model. We follow
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer’s (2011) pro-
posal that information processing is gen-
erally underpinned by rules. Additionally,
we propose that rules, including those that
ground automatic processes, can be repre-
sented logically.
“The individual’s representation will
generally be selective and will not include
all features [. . .]” (Payne et al., 1993; p.
21). Consider a rule prescribing ignorance
of potential exceptions until explicit evi-
dence is encountered: if there is no positive
information about a given event, assume
it does not occur. Those “given events”
are abnormalities with respect to a habit-
ual process, e.g., both additional goals
from Section Illustrating Tri-Dimensional
Processing define abnormalities relative
to default driving contexts. Abnormalities
can be represented as activations of dif-
ferent goals in non-default circumstances.
Novel tasks are paradigmatically abnormal
relative to familiar ones.
This rule is the closed-world assump-
tion for reasoning about abnormalities
(CWAab); it has been shown to be
involved in various cognitive phenom-
ena, e.g., the suppression-task (Stenning
and van Lambalgen, 2008). CWAab pro-
motes minimal cognitive effort, so it
appropriately represents automatic pro-
cessing. However, explicit evidence for
abnormalities, e.g., everybody driving on
the right, allows contextually overrid-
ing the assumption and hence flexible
processing.
Closed-world reasoning is embedded
in Logic Programming, a cognitively rel-
evant formalism for backwards reasoning
from goals to actions (Stenning and van
Lambalgen, 2008). Information processing
with CWAab is implementable in a Logic
Programming cognitive model.
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Daniel Kahneman (2011) exemplifies the
evaluative contrast of perceptual and cog-
nitive phenomena. The Müller-Lyer illu-
sion instantiates the correct type 2 vs. the
illusory type 1 processing3.
“Now that you have measured the
lines, you – your System 2, the con-
scious being you call “I”– have a new
belief: you know that the lines are equal
[. . . ] But you still see the bottom line
as longer. You have chosen to believe
the measurement, but you cannot pre-
vent System 1 from doing its thing; you
cannot decide to see the lines as equal,
although you know they are. To resist
the illusion [. . .] you must learn to mis-
trust your impressions of the length of
lines when fins are attached to them. To
implement that rule, you must be able to
recognize the illusory pattern and recall
what you know about it. If you can do
this, you will never again be fooled by the
Müller-Lyer illusion. But you will still see
one line as being longer than the other.”
(Kahneman, 2011; p. 27)
In contrast, we argue that the Müller-Lyer
figure can illustrate a perceptual (type 1)
but also a cognitive illusion (type 2).When
familiar with the illusion, I know that the
lines’ relative lengths are not as I perceive
them. However, a substantial number of
undetectable variations in length are pos-
sible. For instance, if the line perceived as
longer in the original figure is elongated
by 5% (below threshold, cf. Weber’s law),
physics and perception are congruent. In
this case type 1 processes would provide
the correct view, while type 2 would erro-
neously doubt this judgment because it
“knows that it knows better.” Thus, sys-
tematic mistrust of type 1 processing is
inappropriate.
Cognitive economy considerations
raise further concerns. Kahneman has
been one of the first to acknowledge
such considerations while, however,
attaching negative connotations to our
profound “laziness” (Kahneman, 2011).
We propose that always doubting our
initial percept produces a costs—benefits
3Due to space constraints, throughout this section
we use type 1/2 as umbrella-terms for the features
individuated in our tri-dimensional proposal.
imbalance, due to cognitive overload, and
“paralysis in reasoning” or the inability to
act. Under real time constraints it is often
more costly to “check back” through delib-
erate reflection. Normally the automatic
decisions and default actions are appro-
priate, i.e., they serve their purpose most
efficiently 4. A similar argument against
the “systematic mistrust” of fast automatic
processes has been endorsed by the ABC
group. The mistrust is based on a “more is
better” ideology, which “ignores the eco-
logical rationality of cognitive strategies”
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999; p. 20).
Consequently we view the Müller-Lyer
figure as evidence that both type 1 and
type 2 processes are error-prone. Therefore
error-proneness is not a suitable criterion
to categorize information processing. A
model based on operationalizable process-
ing features promises a more construc-
tive approach, through predictions with
respect to the kinds and amounts of errors,
be those perceptual illusions or cogni-
tive biases. The good and the bad are to
be found a posteriori, through empirical
work.
WRAPPING-UP AND FURTHER-ON
Our proposal provides a more fine-
grained analysis than the dichotomous
dual-process theories: even complex pro-
cessing tokens can be categorized along
three continuous dimensions via teleo-
logical assessment. Processing types may
become available a posteriori, if clusters
arise in the tri-dimensional space. The
goal-centered analysis helps to overcome
the turning point issue of continuous
dimensions. Regarding evaluative claims,
we conclude that good reasoning is the
balance point between efficient and flexi-
ble processing in a tri-dimensional space.
“Goodness” is relative to currently acti-
vated goals, not an intrinsic feature of
processing types.
We aim to corroborate the conjec-
tures set forth in Sections Illustrating
Tri-Dimensional Processing and Toward
A Cognitive Model by constructing a
tri-dimensional model of closed-world
processing (e.g., in Logic Programming),
testing predictions derived from it, and
consequentially refining the proposed
conceptualization.
4The CWAab prescribes these behaviors.
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